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Abstract
We construct a tractable ‘fundamental’ model of money with equilibrium heterogeneity in
money balances and prices. We do so by considering randomized monetary trades in a
standard search-theoretic model of money where agents can hold multiple units of indivisible
‘tokens’ and can oﬀer lotteries on monetary transfers. By studying a simple trading pattern,
we can analytically characterize the monetary distribution. Interestingly, such distributions
match those observed in numerically simulated economies with fully divisible money and price
heterogeneity.
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Introduction

A classic question in monetary theory concerns the eﬀect of money creation in
economies when there is a non-degenerate distribution of money holdings (e.g. Bewley, 1983). Recent work has explored this question within the context of models based
on the Shi-Trejos-Wright monetary search models where money has a ‘fundamental’
allocative role. Molico (1997), Deviatov and Wallace (2001), and Berentsen, Camera
and Waller (2003) are such examples.
The main diﬀerence of the approaches followed in these papers lies in how the authors set up their models in order to study the non-degenerate monetary distributions
that arise. These modeling choices aﬀect the extent and the cause of non-neutrality
in the model. Molico (1997) studies a model of fully divisible money and goods using
numerical methods. The key result is that lump-sum monetary injections are nonneutral due to redistributive and real balance eﬀects. A second approach has relied on
analytical methods in models with manageable—although less general—distributions of
money holdings. By considering a model where agents can hold at most two indivisible tokens, Deviatov and Wallace (2001) show that money is non-neutral as it aﬀects
the quantities traded and the frequency of trading. Berentsen, Camera and Waller
(2003) consider fully-divisible money and goods but focus on simple (two-point) distributions.2 Changes in the money stock are neutral but changes in the money growth
rate aﬀect the distribution and the quantities traded.
This study complements this literature by proposing a model where we relax
the indivisibility of money along two dimensions. Agents can hold multiple units of
indivisible money, as in the divisible-goods framework of Camera and Corbae (1999).
We augment it by allowing agents to engage in randomized monetary trades, as
proposed by Berentsen, Molico and Wright (2002). The possibility to oﬀer lotteries
on money transfers further relaxes the indivisibility of money because it allows flexible
monetary oﬀers. This cures some of the ineﬃciencies arising from the indivisibility.
2

This is achieved by building on the degenerate distribution model of Lagos and Wright (2002),

introducing additional trading periods.

1

We say ‘some’ because only average expenditure is aﬀected — actual expenditure
remains subject to nominal rigidities since the money is either spent or not.
We focus on an equilibrium where it is in every agent’s best interest to engage
in ‘small’ nominal trades. To capture this notion we consider the following spending pattern. Buyers spend no more than one token per trade and spend it with a
probability less than one. This leads to a tractable analytical characterization of
the equilibrium distribution of money and prices, using three parameters: the initial
supply of money, the curvature of preferences, and the agents’ storage capacity. The
use of lotteries leads to analytical tractability mainly because in equilibrium traded
quantities do not dependent on the initial quantity of money (they only depend on
preferences), and every single-coincidence match leads to exchange.
The flexibility in monetary oﬀers allowed by lotteries improves the eﬃciency of
the decentralized monetary solution along the intensive and extensive margins. It
expands the set of nominal oﬀers and so it lessens bilateral trading ineﬃciencies (e.g.
see Berentsen and Rocheteau, 2002). However, it cannot entirely eliminate them, due
to equilibrium heterogeneity in valuations. Furthermore, the use of lotteries amplifies
the beneficial distributional eﬀects possible in models with multiple money inventories
(e.g. see Camera, 2003). This raises the volume of trade, by lowering the fraction
of agents who cannot buy or sell, and it also improves bilateral trading eﬃciency, by
lowering the dispersion in valuations. A key result is that, within the equilibrium
we study, changes in the initial money stock only aﬀect the extensive margin — the
lotteries adjust to keep the quantities traded in each match unchanged.
The most striking result, perhaps, is that even under this simple trading pattern,
the density function of money is hump-shaped, with few agents holding little or too
much money. This is interesting, as this shape closely resembles that seen to arise
from numerical simulations of economies with heterogeneous prices but fully divisible
money (Molico, 1997).
What generates this result? The agent’s equilibrium valuation of a token falls in
his nominal wealth. It follows that the probability of a money transfer increases in
the buyer’s wealth but decreases in the seller’s. Thus the poorest agents accumulate
2

wealth easily, while the richest deplete it quickly. Once averaged across the entire set
of traders, this spending pattern resembles that arising under fully divisible money,
where the poor spend less than the rich but also earn more per trade. This leads
to a density function with thin tails, and a coeﬃcient of variation that is low, and
decreases as money becomes more divisible.

2

Environment

The environment is as in the continuous-time model of Camera and Corbae (1999).
There is a [0, 1] continuum of infinite-lived agents of J ≥ 3 specialization types, in
equal proportions. Each type specializes in consumption and production of divisible
nonstorable goods, where we let Xi be the set of goods that agents of type i consume
but cannot produce. An agent suﬀers disutility −q from production of q > 0 goods,
and enjoys utility u(q) from consumption of a quantity q > 0 of a desired good. We
work with u (q) =

q 1−γ
1−γ ,

γ ∈ (0, 1) , so that q ∗ = 1 is the quantity maximizing u(q)−q.

The instantaneous discount rate is r.
Agents meet bilaterally according to a Poisson process with arrival rate α. In a
random match between agents of types i and i0 , the probability that i produces a
good in Xi0 and i0 produces a good in Xi is zero, while the probability that i produces
a good in Xi0 but i0 does not produce a good in Xi is x ∈ (0, 1). Hence, αx is the
rate at which an agent has a single coincidence match, when he meets someone who
can either consume his production or produce what he likes.
Fiat money is randomly distributed initially in indivisible units that an individual
can freely dispose of, or accumulate up to the bound N ∈ N+ . We denote the
initial money supply by M ∈ [0, N ] and the individual nominal balances by n ∈
N ≡ {0, 1, .., N } . Let mn (t) be the probability that at time t a randomly chosen
PN
agent has accumulated n units of money, so that
n=0 mn (t) = 1. In this case

{m0 (t) , ..., mN (t)} defines the distribution of money in the economy, a probability
P
measure on N that must satisfy M = N
n=0 nmn (t).

3

3

Symmetric stationary monetary equilibrium

We focus on equilibria where strategies and distributions are invariant functions of
time, and agents in an identical state adopt identical strategies. For this reason,
conjecture the existence of a distribution of money satisfying
ṁn (t) = 0 ∀n, t.

3.1

(1)

Terms of Trade

Agents can be either buyers or sellers, depending on the realization of the match.
Those without money can only be sellers, since exchange must be quid-pro-quo, those
with N money can only be buyers, due to the money inventory constraint. We refer
to agents with large balances as being ‘rich,’ as opposed to those with small balances,
the ‘poor.’
We allow the possibility of randomized exchange, along the lines of Berentsen,
Molico and Wright (2002), as follows. Consider a single-coincidence match between a
buyer with b ∈ N\ {0} money balances and a seller with s ∈ N\ {N } money balances.
Let d denote a positive monetary transfer from the buyer to the seller. Here d must
be feasible, that is the buyer cannot oﬀer more than he has or than the seller is
able to accept. Technically, d ∈ Ds,b = {1, 2, ..., min {b, N − s}}. Let qs,b (d) denote
the amount of goods requested by the buyer, given d, and let τ s,b (d) denote the
probability of transferring d to the seller.3
The terms of trade are endogenously formed via bilateral bargaining. We use the
generalized Nash protocol where θ ∈ [0, 1] is the buyer’s bargaining power, and 1 − θ
3

A referee suggests an interesting extension would be to lift the restriction to choosing one single

d first, thus generalizing the model to one where τ s,b (d) is a probability measure on Ds,b ∪ {0}. This
more general formulation would allow to consider strategies where buyers put probability mass on
several possible transfers (e.g. τ s,b (d) > 0 for d = 0, 1, 2, 3), or make transfers with a deterministic
component (e.g. τ s,b (0) = 0 and τ s,b (d) > 0 for d = 1, 2, 3). We surmise this formulation would
lead to the following result. In equilibrium a buyer would always put some probability mass on the
largest feasible transfer when he is in a match with a seller who values money more than the buyer,
and would never do so otherwise.
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the seller’s. For tractability, we restrict the buyer’s strategy to choose a single value
of d first, and then to bargain with the seller over qs,b (d) and τ s,b (d) . It follows that
the terms of trade in this match will be defined by the list {d, qs,b (d) , τ s,b (d)}. By
agreeing to this list, paired agents agree to implement the following trading plan. The
seller produces qs,b (d) goods for the buyer and, conditional on qs,b (d), the buyer gives
d units of money to the seller with probability τ s,b (d) and none otherwise. Ex-ante
commitment to the trade is assumed, so ex-post renegotiation cannot occur.4
Let Vn denote the stationary expected lifetime utility to an agent who has n units
of money, at some date. In a match between buyer b and seller s, where the terms of
trade are given by {d, qs,b (d) , τ s,b (d)}, the seller’s expected net surplus from trade is
−qs,b (d) + τ s,b (d) (Vs+d − Vs ) .
It has two components. The first is deterministic and it comprises the production loss −qs,b (d). The remaining component is the expected net continuation value
τ s,b (d) (Vs+d − Vs ) from receiving d units of money with probability τ s,b (d). This is
the continuation value Vs+d minus the reservation value Vs . Similarly, the buyer’s
expected surplus is
u[qs,b (d)] − τ s,b (d) (Vb − Vb−d ) .
Because we are interested in an economy where agents want to engage in ‘small’
nominal trades, we conjecture existence of an equilibrium in which every singlecoincidence match sees the probabilistic exchange of exactly one unit of money. Technically, in all single-coincidence matches (s, b), we have d = 1 and τ s,b (1) ∈ (0, 1), so
that we drop the index d when understood.
This conjectured pattern of exchange can be a monetary equilibrium only if ∀n

4

Vn+1 > Vn ≥ 0

(2)

A referee suggests to think of this as a multi-stage process. First, the buyer chooses one d, and

then the traders bargain over q and τ . Next, the seller produces the agreed-upon goods for the
buyer. Finally, the lottery is run and the buyer gives d units of money to the seller based on the
lottery’s realization. Goods transfers are deterministic, in equilibrium, as goods are divisible. Money
transfers can be probabilistic due to indivisibilities (see Berentsen, Molico and Wright, 2002).

5

otherwise no-one would produce for money. Suppose (2) holds. When qs,b > 0 we
−1
, and the realized nominal payment
define the nominal price in the match by τ s,b qs,b
−1
. Thus, randomized exchange convexifies the space of possible
is either zero or qs,b

nominal oﬀers, although it does not expand the set of feasible monetary transfers. In
equilibrium, if a monetary transfer occurs, its amount d = 1 is independent of the
match’s composition, and the bargained nominal price.
Solving the bargaining problem, under this trading pattern, leads to the following
Lemma 1 Given (2), if d = 1 and τ s,b ∈ (0, 1) in all single coincidence matches
(s, b), then
τ s,b

qs,b
1 − θγ
and qs,b =
=
Vs+1 − Vs 1 − γ

µ

Vs+1 − Vs
Vb − Vb−1

¶1
γ

.

(3)

Proof. In Appendix.
The key result is that, despite the greater flexibility on nominal oﬀers allowed by
lotteries, the quantities traded in equilibrium are generally ineﬃcient, qs,b 6= 1 (where
qs,b > 0 given (2)). The intuition is this. Heterogeneity in money holdings implies
that a buyer meets sellers that can be richer or poorer than him. If rich and poor
agents value money diﬀerently, something we later prove to be true, then nominal
prices and traded quantities will vary across matches.
Technically, the payoﬀs in the Nash product include period utilities, but also the
traders’ net continuation values Vs+1 − Vs and Vb − Vb−1 . These diﬀerences measure
the agent’s valuation of money as a function of his nominal wealth. Unless s = b − 1,
buyer and seller value money diﬀerently, thus q ∗ cannot maximize the Nash product.
If the seller values money more than the buyer, then the seller is willing to produce
a lot per unit of money and the buyer wants to spend a lot. Conversely, if the buyer
values money more than the seller, not only the latter wants to produce little per
unit of money, but the buyer wants to moderate his expenditure. We later show
that in equilibrium the value of money falls in the agent’s nominal wealth, that is
{Vn+1 − Vn } is a positive and decreasing sequence. Hence, expression (3) indicates
that small purchases take place when the seller is richer than the buyer, qs,b < q ∗ if

6

s > b − 1. Conversely, qs,b > q ∗ if s < b − 1.5
A second interesting result is that, given quantities and value functions, the probability of the monetary transfer falls in the buyer’s bargaining power, τ s,b is decreasing
in θ. This tells us that the nominal price of goods falls in each match as the bargaining
power shifts to the buyer, a feature that we will exploit later on.

3.2

Value Function

Under the conjecture that d = 1 and τ s,b ∈ (0, 1) ∀b, s, we can discuss the value
function. Given the recursive structure of the problem facing an agent, the value
function must satisfy
ρV0 =

ρVn =

ρVN

=

N
X

mb [−qn,b + τ n,b (Vn+1 − Vn )]

b=1
N−1
X
s=0
N−1
X
s=0

ms [u(qs,n ) − τ s,n (Vn − Vn−1 )] +

(4)
N
X
b=1

mb [−qn,b + τ n,b (Vn+1 − Vn )] , n 6= 0,(5)
N

ms [u(qs,n ) − τ s,n (Vn − Vn−1 )]

where ρ = r/αx capture the extent of trading frictions, acting eﬀectively as a discount
factor. Specifically, a small ρ corresponds to an economy where trading opportunities
arise frequently or where agents are patient. The first summation of the Bellman
equation (5) indicates that the trader expects to earn surplus u(qs,n )−τ s,n (Vn − Vn−1 )
from matches where the agent is a buyer facing a seller with s units of money. These
matches occur with probability ms . The agent can also earn some surplus, −qn,b +
τ n,b (Vn+1 − Vn ) , from matches where he sells to buyers holding b units of money.
Recall that agents without money can only be sellers, and those who have n = N can
only be buyers. Therefore V0 is obtained by dropping the first summation from (5),
and VN by dropping the second.
5

This explains why randomized trades are always eﬃcient in Berentsen, Molico and Wright (2002).

They study the special case where the distribution of money is degenerate (s = b − 1 = 0 in all
matches).
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(6)

Using (3), equation (5) can be rearranged as
ρVn = γθ

N
−1
X
s=0

ms u (qs,n ) + γ (1 − θ)

N
X
b=1

mb

qn,b
1−γ

dropping the first summation if n = 0, and the second if n = N . Notice that expected
PN
P
qn,b
purchases, N−1
s=0 ms u (qs,n ) , and sales,
b=1 mb 1−γ , both contribute to the agent’s
lifetime utility, as every trade generates surplus to the agent. Since the surplus share

is a function of the trader’s bargaining power, θ and 1−θ multiply the first and second
summation, respectively. The parameter γ, the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution, appears because of the specific CRRA formulation of preferences.6
A definition of the monetary equilibrium, for the conjectured trading pattern,
follows.
Definition 2 Given N and M , a stationary monetary equilibrium with d = 1 and
τ s,b ∈ (0, 1) ∀s, b is a list {Vn , mn , qs,b , τ s,b }n,s,b∈N that satisfies (1)-(6).

4

Characterization of Equilibrium in a Special Case

In proving the existence of an equilibrium where all monetary transfers are random,
it is convenient to focus on the case θ = 1. The reason is that τ s,b falls in the buyer’s
bargaining power. Therefore an equilibrium where ‘small trades’ take place (d = 1)
is easier to support when buyers can make take-it-or-leave-it oﬀers to sellers. In this
case the following holds
Lemma 3 Let θ = 1. If d = 1 and τ s,b ∈ (0, 1), then V0 = 0 and Vn = an V1 for
n ≥ 1 with
ρV1 =

N−1
γ X ms
,
1 − γ s=0 as+1

(7)

q
(Vb −Vb−1 )
Consider u(qs,n ) − τ s,n (Vn − Vn−1 ). Substitute for τ sb to get u(qs,b ) − s,bVs+1
=
−Vs
µ
¶
qs,b u0 (qs,b )
V
−V
b
b−1
u(qs,b ) 1 − u(qs,b )
once we recognize that (3) implies u0 (qs,b ) = Vs+1
−Vs . CRRA preferences
6

imply

qs,b u0 (qs,b )
u(qs,b )

= 1 − γ.
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where a1 = 1 and {an }N
n=2 solves the N − 1 recursive equations
γ

an1−γ (an − an−1 ) = 1.

(8)

Moreover, a2 = a2 (γ) ∈ (1, 2) and {an − an−1 } is a decreasing positive sequence.

Therefore, the sequence {Vn − Vn−1 }N
n=1 is decreasing and positive, and 0 ≤ Vn < ∞.
Proof. In Appendix.
The first thing we notice is that lifetime utilities depend only on the CRRA
coeﬃcient, γ, and the distribution of money. In particular, V0 = 0 when θ = 1,
since no surplus is ever earned from sales, and Vn > 0 otherwise. Furthermore,
lifetime utility Vn rises in money holdings, but it does so at a decreasing rate, so that
in equilibrium richer agents value each unit of money increasingly less than poorer
agents. Consequently, there is heterogeneity in money valuations. As we will see
shortly, this has a crucial implication for the propensity to spend across matches, for
the equilibrium flows of money generated by market transactions, and therefore for
the distribution of money balances.
An important result is that trade between buyer b and seller s takes place at
a nominal price that depends entirely on the seller’s nominal wealth. The nominal
price of the transaction corresponds exactly to the seller’s valuation of money,
τ s,b
1
=
.
qs,b
Vs+1 − Vs

There are two implications. First, the price rises with the seller’s wealth s, because
the value of an additional unit of money, Vs+1 − Vs , falls in s. Therefore, there is
equilibrium price dispersion. Second, while an arbitrary seller s sells goods at the
same price

1
Vs+1 −Vs

to every buyer, the amount of goods sold and the likelihood of a

money transfer hinge on the buyer’s nominal wealth, b. Richer buyers always make
larger purchases and are more likely to spend their money on average, as qs,b and τ s,b
increase in b.7
7

This diﬀers in an important way from the equilibrium d = 1 in Camera and Corbae (1999). There,

the price in the match (b, s) is also (Vs+1 − Vs )−1 . However, every buyer makes the same nominal
oﬀer to seller s, and so every buyer purchases an identical quantity from that seller, independent of
the buyer’s nominal wealth.
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To prove it, use Vn = an V1 and (8). Equilibrium lotteries and quantities are
1

τ s,b

a 1−γ
= b
and qs,b =
as+1 V1

µ

ab
as+1

¶

1
1−γ

.

(9)

Evidently, {qs,b } and {τ s,b } are positive sequences increasing in b and decreasing in s.
That is, (i) richer buyers buy more because they oﬀer to spend a unit of money with a
higher probability, relative to poorer buyers, and (ii) everyone buys more when they
find a low price. This feature of equilibrium spending patterns is key to identifying
the shape of the distribution {mn }, as we next discuss.

4.1

Stationary distributions

If d = 1 and τ s,b ∈ (0, 1) ∀s, b, then (1) gives rise to N + 1 steady-state conditions
that, once normalized by αx, are
m1

mn+1

N−1
X
s=0

τ s,n+1 ms + mn−1

N−1
X

τ s,1 ms = m0

s=0
N
X

τ n−1,b mb = mn

b=1
N−1
X

mN

N
X

τ 0,b mb

b=1
N−1
X

τ s,n ms + mn

s=0

τ s,N ms = mN−1

s=0

N
X

(10)
N
X
b=1

τ n,b mb , n 6= 0,
(11)
N

τ N−1,b mb

(12)

b=1

To interpret them, consider equation (11). Its left-hand-side collects all the inflows
into mn and the right-hand-side collects the outflows. Since all trades involve (by
conjecture) the stochastic exchange of only one unit of money, the endogenous variable
mn grows as buyers with n + 1 units of money spend one unit in matches with some
seller. In a steady state, the buyer transitions to a lower nominal wealth position with
P
probability N−1
s=0 τ s,b ms . The second term indicates that sellers with n − 1 units of
P
money can obtain one more unit with probability N
b=1 τ n−1,b mb . Outflows are due
P
to sellers with n units of money that acquire one more unit, mn N−1
s=0 τ s,n ms , and
PN
buyers with n units who spend one, mn b=1 τ n,b mb . The expressions that account

for changes in the extreme asset positions, 0 and N, are similarly explained.

If we use the equilibrium value of τ s,b in (10)-(12), we obtain the following.
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Lemma 4 Let θ = 1. If d = 1 and τ s,b ∈ (0, 1) ∀s, b, then there exists a unique
stationary distribution of money {mn } that satisfies
N −n

n

N
mn = m0 N mN

n
Y

φ n−N
N

ai

i=2

N
X

N −n

N
Y

j=n+1

n

N
m0 N mN
= 1 and M =

n=0

where φ =

2−γ
1−γ .

φn

aj N , n 6= 0, N
N
X

nmn

(13)

(14)

n=0

Moreover for n 6= 0, N
m2n
=
mn+1 mn−1

µ

an+1
an

¶φ

.

(15)

Proof. In Appendix.
Expression (15) implies that the stationary distribution has more mass in the
interior, i.e. {mn } is a hump-shaped sequence (see Figure 1). The reason is simple.
In equilibrium {τ s,b } is a sequence decreasing in s and increasing in b. This means
that, given b, poor sellers receive money more frequently than rich sellers. Thus
poor sellers quickly increase their money holdings, while rich sellers do so slowly.
Furthermore, given s, poor buyers choose to spend their money less frequently than
rich buyers. Those who are poor are unlikely to get poorer and very likely to increase
their wealth. The opposite is true for rich agents. Both of these features tend to
generate a distribution with a large mass of agents in the center of it, thin tails, and
a low coeﬃcient of variation.
Interestingly, there is a sharp distinction between the distribution of money obtained in this study, relative to the censored-geometric distributions arising in the
absence of lotteries but under a similar spending pattern.8 The most striking feature,
however, is another. The simple transaction pattern we study generates a density
function remarkably similar to that numerically found when agents trade with fully
8

Examples of equilibria where buyers have heterogeneous and bounded holdings, but everyone

spends the same amount of money, can be found in Berentsen (2002), Camera and Corbae (1999)
and Zhou (1999). One can easily verify that when an = 1 for all n then (13) is as in Berentsen, or
(15) is as in Zhou or Camera and Corbae.
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divisible money under an identical bargaining protocol (Molico, 1997). This similarity emerges, despite (i) the very diﬀerent underlying equilibrium spending patterns,
and (ii) even when N is relatively small (see Figure 1), which limits considerably an
individual’s ability to spend small fractions of money balances.
mn

N = 40

0.12

γ =0.8

M = 15
M = 20

0.1

M = 25

0.08
0.06
0.04
0.02

10

20

30

40

n

Figure 1: Stationary distributions for N = 40 and γ = 0.8, for M = 15, 20, 25

The intuition is as follows. If buyers can oﬀer any fraction of their balances there
is no need to use lotteries. Poor buyers generally spend less than the rich, and poor
sellers work harder to earn more money per trade. Now consider our equilibrium with
randomized trades on imperfectly divisible balances. Anyone who spends money,
transfers the same amount — one unit — to every seller. The probability to make
(receive) a transfer, however, increases (decreases) in the agent’s wealth. Thus, our
model generates monetary flows that, once averaged across the entire set of traders,
resemble the monetary flows arising when nominal balances are fully divisible.

4.2

Individually Optimal Strategies

We now provide a condition suﬃcient to guarantee that, under take-it-or-leave-it
oﬀers from buyers to sellers, the conjectured strategy d = 1 and τ s,b ∈ (0, 1), is
12

individually optimal in every single-coincidence match (s, b). To do so, we must
consider three requirements. First, given our restriction on choosing only one d
before bargaining over quantities and probabilities, we need to prove that no monetary
transfer will involve more than one unit of money, i.e. d = 1 ∀s, b. Second, we must
make sure that every transfer will be random, i.e. τ s,b < 1 ∀s, b. Finally, we need to
prove that every buyer oﬀers to spend something in every single-coincidence match,
i.e. τ s,b > 0 ∀s, b. The next lemma provides a suﬃcient condition capable to satisfy
these three requirements.

Lemma 5 Let θ = 1 and consider an equilibrium where d = 1 and τ s,b ∈ (0, 1)
in each single-coincidence match (s, b). If ρ ≤ ρ̄ then this strategy is individually
optimal, with
ρ < ρ̄ =

N−1
1 X ms
γ
.
1 − γ γ1 s=0 as+1
aN

(16)

Proof. In Appendix.

The first step in proving this lemma is to demonstrate that no buyer deviates
from equilibrium to propose a lottery on several units of money. The reasons is
that doing so can only worsen the terms of trade he faces. To see why, note that
our specification of preferences implies the buyer’s surplus from oﬀering a lottery on
some d in order to buy q goods, is γu(q). Thus, buyers choose d to consume as much
as possible. Since Vn is concave, a larger d lowers the seller’s valuation of the money
oﬀered, relative to the buyer’s. This reduces the seller’s willingness to produce per
unit of money, which is bad for the buyer. If the buyer wants to consume more he
should simply raise τ s,b , avoiding the unfavorable distortions generated by oﬀering
lotteries on larger monetary transfers.
Given that d = 1 is individually optimal, the next step requires us to show that
in equilibrium a buyer would never oﬀer to spend money with certainty, i.e. τ s,b < 1.
As expected, patience is the key ingredient to achieve this. Inequality (16) guarantees
that every monetary transfer proposed in every match will be random. Notice that ρ̄
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depends solely on γ, M, and N,via the sequences {an } and {ms }. Numerical analysis
(see Table 1, where M = 1.5) shows that ρ̄ rises in γ, and tends to fall in N , for N
large.
γ = 0.2

γ = 0.5

γ = 0.8

N =2

0.002996

0.112579

0.987207

N =3

0.000902

0.12068

1.55035

N =4

0.000286

0.093182

1.53607

N =5

0.000112

0.072671

1.44424

N =6

0.000052

0.058982

1.36238

Table 1 - The upper bound ρ̄
These findings are quite intuitive. As N increases the average buyer can spend a
progressively smaller fraction of his money balances. Thus as N rises every buyer,
including the richest, will find it less compelling to resort to lotteries. At some
point the richest buyer will prefer to spend at least one unit of money. That is,
the constraint τ 0,N ≤ 1 binds as N rises above a certain threshold, given ρ and
γ. Now recall that ρ captures the extent of trading frictions, and the curvature of
preferences grows with γ. Consider a match (b, s) = (N, 0) where the buyer’s incentive
to spend more than one unit of money is the strongest. There is a trade-oﬀ between
the diminishing marginal utility and trading frictions. When ρ is small the agent
does not discount much the future so he limits current expenditures to spread out
consumption over time. When γ is large agents have less of an incentive to spend a
lot, because marginal utility of consumption decreases very sharply. Hence, the buyer
limits his current consumption by reducing the monetary oﬀer d and the probability
of spending it. Thus trading more than one unit of money is suboptimal when ρ is
suﬃciently small and γ is suﬃciently large. Note that τ 0,N falls as γ rises.9
Finally, it is easy to show that every buyer—even the poorest—oﬀers to spend
something in every single-coincidence match. The reason is he can always oﬀer money
9

Notice, therefore, that the use of lotteries allows us to study economies where N → ∞. Without

lotteries, this is not possible since poor buyers would not buy from sellers that are too rich (see
Camera and Corbae, 1999).
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with a small enough probability that allows him to consume a small quantity, while
limiting the risk of giving away a very valuable unit of money. Interestingly, this is
quite diﬀerent from models without lotteries. In those models some trades may not
take place in equilibrium, when the seller values money very little, relative to the
buyer, as the seller’s (nominal) reservation price,

1
Vs+1 −Vs ,

is too high for the buyer.

When lotteries on money transfers are possible, instead, the buyer can always choose
a small enough probability τ s,b that matches the seller’s reservation price. This allows
the buyer to get at least some consumption that generates flow utility larger than
the expected loss (in terms of net continuation payoﬀs).
Existence of an equilibrium follows from the results listed in the previous lemmas
Proposition 6 Let θ = 1. If ρ ≤ ρ̄, then there exists a stationary monetary equilibrium with d = 1 and τ s,b ∈ (0, 1) ∀s, b.
We emphasize that the allocation achieved in this equilibrium is superior to that
achieved in the absence of lotteries, for two distinct reasons.
First, lotteries improve bilateral trading eﬃciency as agents can make nominal
oﬀers that, on average, are smaller than otherwise possible (see Berentsen and Rocheteau, 2002). This helps push qs,b closer to q ∗ in every match, a positive ‘intensive
margin’ eﬀect. Bilateral trading ineﬃciencies remain, however, due to equilibrium
heterogeneity in money holdings and valuations.
Second, lotteries amplify the positive ‘extensive margin’ eﬀects associated to the
agents’ ability to spend only part of their balances (see Camera, 2003). The randomized money transfers foster a redistribution of money from rich to poor agents,
shifting the distribution’s mass closer to mean holdings and away from the tails. This
has two beneficial consequences. It raises the volume of trade, by lowering the fraction
of penniless agents (who cannot buy) and richest agents (who cannot sell). It also
increases bilateral trading eﬃciency, by reducing the dispersion in money holdings,
hence the disparities in valuations responsible for the ineﬃcient selection of qs,b .
These considerations lead us to wonder whether there is an optimum quantity of
money, capable of maximizing these beneficial eﬀects.
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4.3

The optimum quantity of money
PN

Define welfare W , as satisfying W =
Lemma 3
W =

n=1 mn ρVn .

N
X

Using Vn = an V1 and V1 from

mn an ρV1 .

n=1

It is obvious that W is a function of M — since it aﬀects the distribution of money —
∗ denote the initial quantity of money
and of γ, that aﬀects {an } . Therefore, let MN

that maximizes W.
For N = 2 one can prove that M2∗ = N/2 = 1 and, surprisingly, is independent
∗ for N > 2 we have to resort to numerical simulations (see
of γ. In order to find MN

Table 2).
γ = 0.2

γ = 0.5

γ = 0.8

N =2

1

1

1

N =3

1.4987

1.4921

1.4649

N =4

2.0168

1.9974

1.9302

N =5

2.5605

2.5224

2.4084

N =6

3.1272

3.0658

2.9016

Table 2- The optimal M
∗ is approximately
The simulations suggest that the optimal quantity of money MN

equal to N/2. The latter is the optimal quantity in a similar model where prices are
exogenously fixed and lotteries are not allowed (see Berentsen, 2002).
The implication of this numerical experiment is that changes in the initial money
stock, such that the conjectured equilibrium does not break down, are non-neutral.
For M < M ∗ there are too many agents with insuﬃcient money balances (too few
buyers) while for M > M ∗ agents have too much money (too few sellers). Note that
for given values of N and γ, small changes in M do not aﬀect the quantities traded in
any match since from (9) they only depend on γ. Therefore, changes in M only aﬀect
the volume of trade via its eﬀects on the extensive margin, i.e. via the distribution
of money holdings.
Because non-neutralities in this model depend on the measure of poor agents,
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who face the most stringent constraints in their consumption ability, it is natural to
ask how the distribution changes as we increase the degree of divisibility of money.
More concentrated distributions would imply less significant extensive margin eﬀects
from changes in money. Below, we report the coeﬃcient of variation as we change
the degree of divisibility of money. This is done by increasing proportionately M
and N , maintaining their ratio fixed. This is equivalent to making the initial money
supply more divisible, while keeping it constant (see Camera, 2003). Table 3 reports
the coeﬃcient of variation when M/N = 0.5 and γ = 0.8.
N

M

coeff.of variation

1

0.5

1

2

1

0.6800

3

1.5

0.5568

4

2

0.4940

5

2.5

0.4539

6

3

0.4246

7

3.5

0.4014

8

4

0.3823

9

4.5

0.3659

10

5

0.3517

Table 3 - Divisibility and Dispersion
As money becomes more divisible we move down the coeﬀ. of variation column, and
the distribution becomes more tightly concentrated around the mean (the coeﬃcient
of variation falls). Thus, increased divisibility appears to reduce the monetary nonneutralities that impinge on a beneficial redistribution of money.
Finally, we also consider how the stationary distribution of money holdings is
aﬀected when the curvature of preferences changes. Our simulations indicate that
if γ is small, then the distribution is more concentrated around the mean. This
can be explained as follows. If γ is small, the marginal utility of consumption does
not decrease very sharply, therefore agents are not so eager to smooth consumption
across time. This makes them more willing to spend money to acquire goods in each
17

meeting, which generates higher prices. Higher prices lead to a concentration of the
distribution around the mean as can be seen in Figure 2.
mn

N = 30

M = 15

0.14
γ = 0.1

0.12
0.1
0.08
0.06
0.04

γ = 0.9

0.02

5

10

15

20

25

30

n

Figure 2: Stationary distributions for N = 30 and M = 15, for γ = 0.1, 0.9

5

Conclusion

We have presented an analytically tractable search-theoretic model of money that
accounts for equilibrium heterogeneity in money balances and prices. The model
relaxes the typical indivisibility of money of the Shi-Trejos-Wright framework by
augmenting it with the possibility of holding multiple inventories of indivisible tokens
and of engaging in randomized monetary trades.
The most striking result, perhaps, is the model’s ability to generate monetary distributions that closely resemble those observed in numerical simulations of economies
with fully divisible money and goods, and non-degenerate money distributions (Molico,
1997). The flexibility in monetary oﬀers granted by lotteries improves the eﬃciency of
the decentralized monetary solution along the extensive margin. It also lessens intensive margin ineﬃciencies, without completely curing them, however. In fact, trades
remain generally ineﬃcient since the non-degenerate equilibrium monetary distribution leads to heterogeneity in valuations of money. Because price-formation occurs
18

via a process of bilateral bargaining, trades are ineﬃcient when buyer and seller
value diﬀerently the monetary oﬀer. Numerical experiments indicate that as money
becomes more divisible these ineﬃciencies are diminished since the distribution of
money becomes more concentrated around the mean.
We think our approach can be successfully employed to study of a variety of issues
pertinent to economies that allow for non-degeneracy of price and money holdings
distributions. Such issues include the eﬀects of money creation on welfare, and on
the distribution of prices and money.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Suppose it is optimal for every buyer to choose d = 1. The
optimal oﬀer pair {qs,b , τ s,b } solves the Nash program
max

qs,b ,τ s,b

[u (qs,b ) − τ s,b (Vb − Vb−1 )]θ [−qs,b + τ s,b (Vs+1 − Vs )]1−θ s.t τ s,b ≤ 1

Suppose that Vs+1 > Vs , otherwise no trade would take place. Substituting for τ s,b ,
consider the Lagrangian
max

λs,b ,qs,b ,τ s,b

[u (qs,b ) − τ s,b (Vb − Vb−1 )]θ [−qs,b + τ s,b (Vs+1 − Vs )]1−θ + λs,b (1 − τ s,b )

where λs,b is the multiplier on τ s,b ≤ 1, independent of d because in the equilibrium
conjectured every buyer oﬀers d = 1. The equilibrium qs,b , τ s,b and λs,b must satisfy
three suﬃcient and necessary first-order conditions
u(qs,b ) − τ s,b (Vb − Vb−1 )
θ
=
1−θ
−qs,b + τ s,b (Vs+1 − Vs )
u(qs,b ) − τ s,b (Vb − Vb−1 )
Vb − Vb−1 θ
=
− λs,b A
Vs+1 − Vs 1 − θ
−qs,b + τ s,b (Vs+1 − Vs )
λs,b (1 − τ s,b ) = 0
u0 (qs,b )

where A =

h

i
−qs,b +τ s,b (Vs+1 −Vs ) θ
u(qs,b )−τ s,b (Vb −Vb−1 )

≥ 0. Note how qs,b and τ s,b generally depend on

both the seller’s and the buyer’s wealth positions, via their reservation values Vs+1 −Vs
and Vb −Vb−1 , and their relative bargaining powers, θ/ (1 − θ) . Two cases might arise,
depending on whether the constraint τ s,b ≤ 1 is binding or not.
1. If τ s,b = 1 then λs,b > 0. Hence u0 (qs,b ) =
2. If τ s,b ≤ 1 then λs,b = 0. Hence

u0 (q

s,b )

=

1−θ
θ

·

u(qs,b )−(Vb −Vb−1 )
−qs,b +Vs+1 −Vs .

Vb −Vb−1
Vs+1 −Vs

⇒ qs,b =

³

Vs+1 −Vs
Vb −Vb−1

´1
γ

. That

is the marginal utility from consumption from spending d = 1, with probability
τ s,b , must be equal to the ratios of the value of that unit of money to seller
and buyer. Notice that since

Vs+1 −Vs
Vb −Vb−1

6= 1, in general, the quantity trade will

be generally ineﬃcient, unless buyer and seller ‘swap’ wealth positions (i.e.
s = b − 1).
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From the first order conditions we obtain
τ s,b

¸
·
u (qs,b )
u(qs,b )
qs,b
qs,b
+θ
(1 − θ)
= (1 − θ)
+θ
=
Vb − Vb−1
Vs+1 − Vs
Vs+1 − Vs
qs,b u0 (qs,b )
qs,b
1 − θγ
=
Vs+1 − Vs 1 − γ

so that we see that, given

qs,b
Vs+1 −Vs ,

τ s,b decreases in θ.¥

Proof of Lemma 3 If d = 1 and τ s,b ∈ (0, 1), then for n 6= 0, N
µ
¶
N−1
Vs+1 − Vs
γ X
ms
ρVn =
1 − γ s=0
Vn − Vn−1
Note that
ρVn (Vn − Vn−1 )

1−γ
γ

N−1
1−γ
γ X
=
ms (Vs+1 − Vs ) γ
1 − γ s=0

is independent of n. It follows that for n ≥ 2 :
Vn (Vn − Vn−1 )

1−γ
γ

Vn−1 (Vn−1 − Vn−2 )

1−γ
γ

1−γ
γ

Vn
=1⇒
=
Vn−1

µ

Vn−1 − Vn−2
Vn − Vn−1

¶ 1−γ
γ

VN
⇒
=
V1

µ

V1 − V0
VN − VN−1

¶ 1−γ

because of a telescoping product.
If we let a1 = 1, a0 = 0, and Vn = an V1 then

Vn
Vn−1

=

(an − an−1 ) V1 . Therefore we can find {an }N
n=1 recursively:
a2
a1

=

γ
1−γ

an

³

V1 −V0
V2 −V1

´ 1−γ
γ

an
an−1

and Vn − Vn−1 =

γ

⇒

(an − an−1 ) = 1

a21−γ (a2 − 1) = 1

(since a1 = 1)

∀2<n≤N

Thus an is a function solely of γ, hinging on a2 = a(γ). It is easy to see that a2 > 1
γ

and a2 < 2 because a21−γ (a2 − 1) increases in a2 and at a2 = 2 does not satisfy
the equality above. Also, {an − an−1 } is a positive but decreasing sequence (because
γ

an −an−1 = 1/an1−γ , an −an−1 must be decreasing in n). Therefore Vn is an increasing
function of n, and {Vn − Vn−1 } is a decreasing sequence.
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γ

Use the result that Vn − Vn−1 = (an − an−1 ) V1 . Then:

1−γ
γ PN−1
γ
= 1−γ
s=0 ms (Vs+1 − Vs )
1−γ
1−γ
1−γ
γ PN−1
γ V γ
ρV1 (V1 ) γ = 1−γ
1
s=0 ms (as+1 − as )
1−γ
γ PN−1
ρV1 = 1−γ s=0 ms (as+1 − as ) γ
γ PN−1 ms
ρV1 = 1−γ
s=0 as+1

ρV1 (V1 − V0 )

1−γ
γ

(use Vs − Vs−1 = (as − as−1 ) V1 )
(use (as+1 − as )

1−γ
γ

= a−1
s+1 )

where we notice that V1 < ∞ since {as+1 − as } is a converging sequence.
1

Using the definition of an , τ s,b =

abγ

as+1 V1 .

Hence, {τ s,b } is a sequence increasing in

b and decreasing in s.¥

Proof of Lemma 4 To start we notice that (10) - (12) imply
mn

N
X

τ n,b mb = mn+1

N−1
X

τ s,n+1 ms

s=0

b=1

∀n 6= N

(17)

which means that the expected money flow to sellers with n units of money, must
be equal to the expected money outflow of buyers with n + 1 units of money. To see
why this holds, start with (10), and then use it in (11) with n = 1. Observe that
only the summations to the extreme left and extreme right of (11) are left (the inner
summations cancel out). Then repeat it recursively, for each n < N.
Now use (17) replacing the lotteries by their expressions given in (9) to get
mn
an+1

PN

2−γ
1−γ

⇒

mn+1
mn an+1

⇒

mn
mn+1

since (10) implies

m1
m0

1

1

1−γ
1−γ
mb = mn+1 an+1
b=1 ab

=
=

=

1
PN
1−γ
mb
b=1 ab
P N −1 ms
s=0 as+1
2−γ
1−γ

PN−1

ms
s=0 as+1

m0
m1 an+1

1
PN
1−γ
mb
b=1 ab
P
N −1 ms
s=0

∀n 6= N
(18)
∀n 6= N

after one substitutes for (9).

as+1

We can use the last line of (18) for any two adjacent n and n + 1 to obtain
¶ 2−γ
µ
an+1 1−γ
m2n
=
∀n 6= 0, N
(19)
mn+1 mn−1
an
n
oN−1
oN−1
n
mn
mn
This tells us that an+1
is
a
decreasing
sequence
so
that
an
mn+1 mn−1 n=1 is
n=1
n
oN−1
n
a decreasing sequence also. It follows that mmn+1
cannot be an increasing
n=1
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sequence, i.e. mn > mn+1 ∀n 6= 0, N cannot be an equilibrium. Now use the last line
of (18). We see that m0 > m1 is not possible (it would imply mn > mn+1 ∀n 6= 0, N ).
Thus m0 < m1 must hold. Since mn > mn+1 ∀n 6= 0, N is not possible, then the only
equilibrium is mn < mn+1 for some 1 ≤ n < n∗ and mn > mn+1 for n ≥ n∗ . That is,
{mn } is hump-shaped.
Since

mn+1
m0

=

mn+1
mn

2−γ

×

mn
mn−1

mn+1
=
m0
− 2−γ
1−γ

Let An+1 = Πn+1
j=1 aj

µ

× ... ×

m1
m0

¶n+1

m1
m0

and

mn
mn+1

− 2−γ
1−γ

Πn+1
j=1 aj

=

m0 1−γ
m1 an+1

then

for all n 6= N.

for n 6= N , and notice that A0 = 1. Then, the stationary

distribution solves the system of N + 1 non-linear equations in N + 1 unknowns.:
³ ´n+1
1
An+1
mn+1 = m0 m
m0
³
´
n+1
P
m1
An+1 = 1
m0 + N−1
n=0 m0 m0
³ ´n+1
PN−1
m1
An+1 = M
n=0 (n + 1) m0 m0

∀n 6= 0, N

These expressions can be rewritten to yield (13) and (14).
We next show uniqueness of the stationary distribution for any N and money
³ ´n+1
P −1
m1
m
An+1 =
supply M ∈ (0, N ). The first thing to note is that m0 + N
0 m0
n=0

∂m1
∂m0 < 0. Thus, for any N and m0 there is a unique M that satisfies
³ ´n+1
³ ´n+1
PN−1
m1
1
A
and
m
+
m
An+1 = 1. Next, note that
mn+1 = m0 m
n+1
0
0 m0
n=0
m0
³
´
n+1
PN−1
m1
An+1 = M implies that m0 is monotonically decreasing
n=0 (n + 1) m0 m0

1 implies

in M (recall that

∂m1
∂m0

< 0). Accordingly, for any n and M ∈ (0, N ) there is a unique

{mn } satisfying (13) and (14).¥

Proof of Lemma 5 Let θ = 1. Suppose d = 1 and τ s,b ∈ (0, 1) ∀b, s is an equilibrium. Consider the strategy of a representative buyer b in a match with a seller s. To
prove individual optimality of the strategy proposed we take three steps. Finally, we
prove that every single coincidence match will result in a trade. That is the buyer
always puts a positive probability on the transfer of d = 1.
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1. First, we prove that if a buyer oﬀers a lottery on the transfer of d ∈ Ds,b
units of money, then d = 1 is individually optimal. The proof is by means of
contradiction. Pick any feasible oﬀer d and suppose that the buyer wants to
oﬀer a lottery. Since the buyer extracts the seller’s entire surplus, then the
optimal transfer probability must satisfy τ s,b (d) ∈ [0, 1] and
τ s,b (d) =

qs,b (d)
.
Vs+d − Vs

Given this probability, the buyer chooses qs,b (d) to maximize his surplus
u[qs,b (d)] − τ s,b (d)(Vb − Vb−d ) = u[qs,b (d)] − qs,b (d)
Since u(q) =

q1−γ
1−γ ,

Vb − Vb−d
.
Vs+d − Vs

then optimal consumption is
qs,b (d) =

µ

Vs+d − Vs
Vb − Vb−d

¶1
γ

.

(20)

The implication is that, given d ∈ Ds,b , when τ s,b (d) and qs,b (d) are optimally
chosen then the buyer’s surplus is u[qs,b (d)] − qs,b (d)qs,b (d)γ , or
γu[qs,b (d)].

(21)

Clearly the d that maximizes (21) must generate the largest quantity, i.e. it
´1
³
V
−Vs γ
. It is easily proved that
must maximize qs,b (d) = Vs+d
b −Vb−d
Vb −Vb−d
Vs+d −Vs

=

(Vb −Vb−1 )+(Vb−1 −Vb−2 )+...+(Vb−d+1 −Vb−d )
(Vs+d −Vs+d−1 )+(Vs+d−1 −Vs+d−2 )+...+(Vs+1 −Vs )

≥

Vb −Vb−1
Vs+1 −Vs

∀d ≥ 1

since Vb − Vb−1 < Vb−1 − Vb−2 < .. < Vb−d+1 − Vb−d , while Vs+1 − Vs > Vs+2 −
Vs+1 > ... > Vs+d − Vs+d−1 , because {Vn+1 − Vn } is a decreasing sequence, in
equilibrium. That is, raising d above one, increases the numerator and decreases
the denominator of the ratio

Vb −Vb−d
Vs+d −Vs .

Since

Vb −Vb−d
Vs+d −Vs

≥

Vb −Vb−1
Vs+1 −Vs

∀d ≥ 1, then it

follows that setting d ≥ 2 is worse than oﬀering d = 1. Oﬀering a lottery on
d ≥ 2 is suboptimal because, in the equilibrium conjectured, it simply reduces
the quantity consumed by the buyer, hence his surplus.
2. Now we provide a condition guaranteeing that τ s,b < 1 is individually optimal.
That is, oﬀering d = 1 with certainty is suboptimal. In the conjectured equilibrium τ s,b (1) = τ s,b , defined by (3) for θ = 1. Because {τ s,b } is increasing in
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b and decreasing in s, it follows that a suﬃcient condition for τ s,b (1) < 1 is
τ 0,N < 1. Using the results in the prior Lemmas, this amounts to the inequality
1/γ

aN
V1

< 1 that, substituting for V1 can be rearranged as
N−1
1 X ms
γ
.
ρ < ρ̄ =
1 − γ γ1
a
aN s=0 s+1

It is seen that the sequences {an } and {ms } only depend on γ, M, and N .
3. Finally, we prove that every buyer oﬀers to spend something in every singlecoincidence match, i.e. τ s,b > 0 ∀s, b is individually optimal. Since τ s,b =
qs,b
Vs+1 −Vs

in equilibrium, the buyer’s expected surplus is positive in every possible

match, i.e. u(qs,b ) − τ s,b (Vb − Vb−1 ) ≡ γu(qs,b ) > 0 ∀s, b. In equilibrium qs,b =
´1
³
Vs+1 −Vs γ
.Therefore τ s,b > 0.¥
Vb −Vb−1
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